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The impact of object naming on object drawing confirms an association between object 
categorisation and viewpoint-independence in longer-term visual remembering. Adult 
participants viewed a novel object from a viewpoint from which it would not normally be 
drawn from memory. The experimenter either labelled the object with a novel count noun 
(“Look at this dax”) or did not (“Look at this object”). Participants then drew the object from 
immediate, short-term, or longer-term memory, with no constraints being imposed on how 
they should depict the object. When the object was named at presentation, but not otherwise, 
the transition from immediate to longer-term remembering increased the likelihood that the 
object was depicted from a viewpoint from which it had not been seen. This trend was 
reversed when participants were asked to depict the object in the orientation in which it had 
appeared to them. These results are discussed in relation to an account of the conditions 
under which visual category representations become established and may be used 
preferentially over image-like visual representations. 
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Object Naming Induces Viewpoint-Independence in Longer-Term Visual 
Remembering: Evidence From a Simple Object Drawing Task 
 Evidence is accumulating to suggest that short-term and longer-term visual 
remembering can rely on representations that preserve contrasting information about objects. 
For example, compared to short-term remembering, longer-term remembering is more likely 
to utilise visual information about object categories than about specific objects (Avons & 
Phillips, 1987; Burgund & Marsolek, 2000; Marsolek, 1995), and information that specifies 
object shape categorically rather than with metric accuracy (Rosielle & Cooper, 2001). It is 
less likely to utilise information about the specific viewpoints from which objects were 
originally seen (Biederman & Cooper, 1991, 1992; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; 
Cooper, 1994; Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Ellis, Allport, Humphreys, & Collis, 1989; Seamon 
& Delgado, 1999; Seamon, Ganor-Stern et al., 1997; Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002; 
Stankiewicz, Hummel, & Cooper, 1998), or visual information about the colours of objects 
(Brandimonte, Schooler, & Gabbino, 1997; Cooper, 1994; Hitch, Brandimonte, & Walker, 
1995; Seamon et al., 1997; Walker et al., 1997). 
 These contrasting aspects of objects, that are differentially associated with short-term 
and longer-term remembering, might be preserved in two distinct types of visual 
representation. Candidate representations are images, such as those proposed by Tarr (e.g., 
Tarr, 1995), and structural descriptions, such as the geon structural descriptions (GSDs) 
proposed by Biederman (e.g., Biederman, 1995). Images are object-specific, preserve 
information about the object’s orientation in depth relative to the viewer, and are likely to 
capture all the visible features of an object (e.g., its surface colour). In contrast, GSDs 
represent object categories at an intermediate level of abstraction, and focus on the shape of 
category relevant object parts in their spatial configuration, to the exclusion of information 
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about an object’s material properties (including colour).1  With shape being encoded 
categorically, rather than with metric accuracy, GSDs are tolerant to the variation in shape 
among exemplars from a category. They are also largely insensitive to orientation in depth, 
and so can tolerate variations in the viewpoint from which an exemplar is observed. Perhaps, 
therefore, it is because these different forms of representation are differentially associated 
with short-term and longer-term remembering that information about contrasting aspects of 
objects has varying relevance depending on memory delay. The proposal is not that short-
term and longer-term remembering are exclusively dependent on different types of 
representation, but rather that, though both types of representation can support visual 
remembering in most situations, there is a tendency for longer-term remembering to rely on 
GSD-like structural descriptions when these are available.   
 If the various features of objects associated with longer-term visual memory are 
preserved in a single representation, then their involvement in visual remembering should be 
highly correlated. For example, when participants appear to rely on visual category 
representations in longer-term remembering, their performance should also confirm the 
viewpoint-invariance of these representations. Conversely, when participants are deprived of 
the opportunity to rely on category representations, longer-term remembering should reveal 
the same sensitivity to viewpoint that is observed in short-term remembering, because in both 
cases viewpoint-specific object representations will mediate performance. 
 The experiment reported here was designed to assess this particular prediction. It did 
so by exploiting the impact object naming has on the creation of visual category 
representations. Thus, naming novel objects with novel count nouns2 induces infants and 
young children to establish shape-based category representations for the objects (e.g., 
Baldwin, 1989; Hall, 1993; Hall & Moore, 1997; Hall, Quantz, & Persoage, 2000; Hall & 
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Waxman, 1993; Landau, 1994; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1992; Waxman, 1999a; Waxman & 
Booth, 2001; Waxman & Hall, 1993), and it does so at an intermediate taxonomic level (Hall, 
1993; Hall & Waxman, 1993; Waxman, 1999a; Waxman & Hall, 1993; Xu, Carey, & Welch, 
1999). 
 With this evidence in mind, the potential for a three-way association between longer-
term remembering, object categorisation, and viewpoint-independence was assessed by 
examining the impact of object naming on visual memory for a novel object at varying 
memory delays. It was expected that increasing evidence for viewpoint-independence would 
emerge with the shift from immediate to longer-term remembering, but only when the object 
was named, because only then would a visual category representation for the object be 
established. 
 A simple drawing task was employed to determine if object naming and memory 
delay combine to increase the viewpoint-independence evident in adults’ drawings of a novel 
object from memory. Participants drew a novel object from immediate, short-term, or longer-
term memory. Prior to drawing, the object was presented for inspection from a single 
viewpoint, at which time the experimenter either named the object with a novel count noun, 
or did not name it. The restricted viewpoint from which participants inspected the object was 
not one from which participants would normally depict the object. Depicting the object from 
a viewpoint other than this restricted viewpoint was to be taken as evidence for viewpoint-
independence in visual remembering. No constraints were placed on how participants were to 
draw the object, and in particular, whether they should draw it in the orientation from which 
it had been seen by them (e.g., participants were simply instructed to ‘Draw the dax’ or 
‘Draw the first/second object’). It was predicted that the combined effect of naming the novel 
object at presentation and testing longer-term remembering, would be to increase the 
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viewpoint-independence evident in participants’ drawings, as revealed by a reduced tendency 
to depict the object from the restricted viewpoint from which it had been seen. Finally, to 
check if participants in this condition could still remember how the object had appeared to 
them, an additional control condition was run where participants were specifically asked to 
draw the object in the orientation in which it had appeared to them. 
Method 
Participants  
 One hundred and sixty one students at Lancaster University, aged between 18 and 32 
years, completed the experiment. They were not paid for their participation. 
Materials  
 Two novel objects were constructed out of wood. They each comprised an 18 cm 
cube, with a smaller wooden part attached to the centre of one face. For one object, the 
attached part was a pyramid, with an 11 cm square base and a vertex of 10 cm. For the other 
object, the attached part was a 7.5 cm diameter sphere.  
Design  
 A 3x2 independent-groups design was created by crossing two factors. The factors 
were Memory Delay (immediate, short-term, and longer-term remembering) and Object 
Naming (object named versus object unnamed). An equal number of participants (n = 23) 
was assigned randomly to each of these six groups. An additional, control group of 
participants (n = 23) was assigned to a longer-term remembering with object naming 
condition, with the constraint that they should depict the object in the orientation it had 
appeared to them. The groups had similar mean ages and male:female ratios. For the object 
named conditions, the mean ages (in years) and male:female ratios (in parentheses) were 19.8 
(5:18), 19.4 (4:19), 19.7 (6:17), and 20.3 (4:19), for the immediate, short-term, longer-term, 
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and longer-term control conditions, respectively. The corresponding values for the object 
unnamed conditions were 19.6 (4:19), 20.4 (5:18), and 19.7 (5:18), for the immediate, short-
term, and longer-term conditions, respectively. Only four of the participants drew with their 
left-hand (one male in each of the immediate remembering with object naming and longer-
term remembering with object naming conditions, and one female in each of the immediate 
remembering without object naming and short-term remembering without object naming 
conditions). 
Procedure  
 Each object in turn was presented for visual inspection for 20 s, and then immediately 
removed from sight for the remainder of the experiment (see Figure 1). In all conditions, 
between presentation of the two objects, participants engaged in a visual imagery task for 1 
min. This was intended to ensure participants were unable to hold the first object in mind by 
continually visualising it (cf. Phillips, 1983, for discussion of the link between visualisation 
and visual memory). The imagery task was taken from Finke, Pinker, and Farah (1989), and 
required participants to imagine transforming and combining two letters of the alphabet to 
discover an emerging object. In the immediate memory condition, participants were asked to 
draw the second object immediately after it had been removed. In the short-term and longer-
term memory conditions, after the second object had been inspected and removed from view, 
participants were asked to engage in the imagery task for a second time, again for 1 min. In 
the short-term memory condition, participants were then asked to draw the second object. In 
the longer-term memory condition, they were asked to draw the first object. The order of 
presentation of the two objects was arranged to ensure that it was always the object with the 
pyramid attachment that was drawn. Thus, whereas this object was the first object to be 
presented in the longer-term memory condition, it was the second object to be presented in 
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the immediate and short-term memory conditions. This object was always inspected by 
participants from a restricted view. Specifically, the experimenter held the object in front of 
the participant with the attached part always pointing down. Previous research has shown that 
this is rarely an orientation in which this type of object will be drawn after it has been seen 
from all major viewpoints (cf., Walker et al., 2006). Viewing of the other object was 
unrestricted, with the experimenter rotating the object in front of the participant following a 
carefully rehearsed routine that exposed the object equally from every major viewpoint. 
Participants did not know in advance which object they would be asked to draw, or how they 
would be asked to draw it. In the object named condition, as the experimenter presented each 
object for inspection, she named it using one of two novel count nouns (i.e., “This is a 
riff/dax. Please look at this riff/dax.”) A different label was assigned to the two objects. 
When later requesting participants in this condition to draw one of the objects, she said “Do 
you remember the first/second object? It was a riff/dax. Please now draw it for me.” In the 
object unnamed condition, as the experimenter presented each object for inspection, she said 
“This is an object. Please look at this object.” When later requesting participants in this 
condition to draw one of the objects, she said “Do you remember the first/second object? 
Please now draw the first/second object for me.” In the additional control condition, which 
combined longer-term remembering and object naming, the experimenter requested 
participants to draw the first object in the orientation in which it had appeared to them, saying 
“Do you remember the first object? It was a riff/dax. Please now draw it for me in the 
orientation in which it had appeared to you.” 
Results 
 The view from which the object was depicted in each drawing was assessed by a 
colleague who was ignorant of the purpose of the study and of the conditions under which 
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each drawing had been produced. In every case, it was clear that the attached part had been 
including in the drawing, and in which direction the object (i.e, the attached part) was 
pointing. 
 Figure 2 presents the number of drawings in each condition where the object was 
depicted either from the restricted viewpoint from which it had been seen, or from some other 
viewpoint. For all statistical analyses, an alpha level of .05 was adopted. 
 Changes in the likelihood of depicting the object from the restricted viewpoint, versus 
some other viewpoint, confirmed the combined impact of object naming and memory delay. 
Aggregating across levels of memory delay, there were significantly more drawings in the 
object named condition, than in the object unnamed condition, that depicted the object from a 
viewpoint other than the one from which it had been seen, Fisher’s Exact p = .002.  In the 
object unnamed condition, the likelihood of depicting the object from the restricted viewpoint 
did not change as memory delay was extended, Linear-by-Linear Association (1, N = 69)  = 
0.76, p = .385. In the object named condition, the likelihood of depicting the object from the 
restricted viewpoint decreased as memory delay was extended, Linear-by-Linear Association 
(1, N = 69)  = 21.25, p < .001. Two separate analyses of the results from the object named 
condition confirmed that the likelihood of depicting the object from the restricted viewpoint 
decreased significantly with both the transition from immediate to short-term remembering, 
Fisher’s Exact p = .023, and with the transition from short-term to longer-term remembering, 
Fisher’s Exact p = .009. Neither of these transitions had a significant impact in the object 
unnamed condition, Fisher’s Exact p = .61 and .19, for the immediate to short-term and 
short-term to longer-term transitions, respectively. 
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 The results from the longer-term remembering control condition were clear. Despite 
having heard the experimenter name the object, all the participants drew the object in the 
orientation in which it had appeared to them. 
Discussion 
 The results confirm that with the transition from immediate to longer-term 
remembering, object naming reduces the likelihood that participants will be constrained to 
depict a remembered object from the viewpoint from which it had been seen. Given the 
evidence linking object naming with object categorisation, this result is consistent with the 
proposal that two distinct types of visual representation are differentially associated with 
short-term and longer-term remembering. More specifically, though both image-like and 
GSD-like representations can support remembering across a full range of circumstances, 
there is a tendency for longer-term remembering to utilise GSD-like representations when 
these are available. Object naming can be a critical factor determining the availability of 
GSD-like representations and, because of this, the extent to which visual remembering is 
viewpoint-independent.3 
 Walker et al. (2006) also have shown that naming a similar novel object (a cube with 
a cone attachment) with a novel count noun can impact on young children’s drawings of the 
object. In their study, however, the object remained available for inspection during drawing. 
Specifically, after it had been shown to the children from every major angle, it was placed in 
position for drawing with the cone hidden from view (i.e., pointing directly away from the 
children). It is known that young children are inclined to depict an object part that is currently 
hidden from view (e.g., Freeman & Janikoun, 1972), and such intellectual realism can be 
seen as another example of viewpoint-independence in drawing. It is relevant to note, 
therefore, that Walker et al. confirmed that if the object was labelled with a novel count noun 
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as it was being inspected prior to drawing, the likelihood that the children would be 
constrained by the viewpoint from which they could see the object was reduced. When the 
object was named, the children showed an increased tendency to depict the object from a 
viewpoint that revealed the hidden part, but only if the name chosen indicated that this part 
was category relevant. In the present context, these results confirm that, despite their 
differential association with longer-term remembering, visual object category representations 
can impact on live drawing (i.e., drawing an object that remains available for inspection). It 
seems, therefore, that when young children engage in live drawing, they behave as if they 
were adults drawing from longer-term visual memory. 
 According to the current proposal, whenever a task requires participants to refer to 
those aspects of an object that are best preserved in an image-like representation, object 
naming will have the potential to impact negatively on performance, especially if this 
involves longer-term, rather than short-term, remembering. The task might require 
participants to draw an object from its current viewpoint, or from the viewpoint from which it 
was last seen. Alternatively, it might require them to reproduce the colour and shape of the 
object with high fidelity.  
 Detrimental effects of object naming on longer-term visual remembering have already 
been demonstrated in studies of visual image combination (cf. Brandimonte, Hitch, & 
Bishop, 1992; Hitch, Brandimonte, & Walker, 1995; Walker et al., 1997). In these studies, 
participants were asked to combine a visual image of a recently presented line drawing with 
an image of a current line drawing. They were then to discover the identity of the object 
resulting from this combination. The nature of the to-be-combined drawings required the 
superimposition of the two images in the mind’s eye to be metrically accurate. In some 
situations, the recently presented visual stimulus was either still available in short-term 
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memory (because no other item had been presented in the interim), or it was available only in 
longer-term memory (because other task-relevant items had been presented in the interim). In 
addition, it was arranged that when the memory item depicted a familiar object, it was either 
named or unnamed at presentation. In agreement with the results of the present study, 
participants were less able to complete the image combination task if the object depicted in 
the first drawing was named at presentation. Moreover, this detrimental effect of naming was 
observed only with longer-term remembering, and not with short-term remembering. Walker 
et al. (1997) proposed that performance was impaired by object naming because this induced 
participants to increase their reliance on a visual representation of the category to which the 
object belonged, with the effect that the shape of the object became less accurately described 
(i.e., there was a shift towards shape being described categorically rather than with metric 
accuracy). Finally, additional support for the current proposal emerged with the observation 
that performance in the image combination task was insensitive to the colour congruity of the 
to-be-combined stimuli, but only when longer-term remembering was being assessed and the 
first figure had been named (Hitch, Brandimonte, & Walker, 1995; Walker et al., 1997). With 
short-term remembering, image combination was impaired when the two figures to be 
combined appeared in different colours (e.g., black-on-grey and white-on-grey), rather than 
the same colour (e.g., both black-on-grey), regardless of whether or not the first figure was 
named. In other words, whereas the visual representation supporting longer-term 
remembering resembled a GSD-like representation insofar as it did not preserve object 
colour, the visual representation supporting short-term remembering resembled an image-like 
representation insofar as it preserved object colour independently of object naming. 
 Much of the evidence confirming the impact of distinct types of visual representation 
in longer-term remembering has involved the contrast between implicit and explicit tests of 
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memory (see, for example, Cooper, 1994, and Srinivas, 1996). For example, though longer-
term priming in both object naming and the possible-impossible object decision task has been 
shown to involve visual representations that do not preserve information about viewpoint and 
object colour, explicit recognition memory for the same stimuli has been shown to involve 
visual representations that do preserve information about these two features (Biederman & 
Cooper, 1991, 1992; Cooper, 1994; Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Seamon & Delgado, 1999; 
Seamon et al., 1997; Srinivas, 1996). Clearly, therefore, a full account of the representational 
basis of visual remembering, and of the moderating influence of object naming, will need to 
acknowledge the distinction between implicit and explicit tests of memory. Nevertheless, the 
present results confirm that, as an explicit test of memory, object drawing tasks can reveal the 
varying contributions of different types of visual representation and the moderating influence 
of object naming.4 
 Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual framework developed here to accommodate the 
results of the present study and related findings (e.g., Hitch, Brandimonte & Walker, 1995; 
Walker et al., 1997). It is proposed that when an object is encountered, distinct visual 
processes support the derivation of the two types of visual representation. These are labelled 
simply as type A and type B processes, so as to remain mute regarding their nature.5  It is 
assumed that image-like visual representations are always established, whereas certain 
conditions have to be satisfied for a visual category representation to be established. 
Combining object naming (i.e., naming a novel object with a novel count noun in the present 
study) with longer-term remembering creates a sufficient condition for this to occur. These 
two component conditions are seen to impact on different aspects of the cognitive resources 
supporting object drawing. Whereas object naming facilitates the derivation of a visual 
category representation, longer-term remembering increases the likelihood that this 
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representation will be used to support performance. Neither of these component conditions is 
thought to be necessary for a category representation to impact on performance. Indeed, 
Biederman and Bar (1999) and Coltheart, Mondy, and Coltheart (2005) have revealed that, 
on the basis of encountering a single view of a novel object, a viewpoint-independent visual 
representation can be established quickly, even in the absence of object naming. And in their 
studies of viewpoint-independent visual priming in the possible-impossible object decision 
task, Schacter and Cooper have revealed a number of visual encoding conditions, other than 
object naming, that lead to the derivation of viewpoint-independent structural descriptions of 
novel objects (e.g., deciding if a novel object depicted in a simple line drawing faces left or 
right, deciding how the object might be used as a tool, or deciding if the object resembles an 
item of household furniture) (Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). 
Schacter and Cooper argue that the need to derive a global structural description of the novel 
object is common to all encoding conditions yielding viewpoint-independent visual priming.  
 It is proposed that image-like representation(s) do not become unavailable or 
inaccessible when a visual category representation is established. Indeed, even when naming 
was combined with longer-term remembering in the control condition of the present study, 
participants were able to draw the critical object in the restricted viewpoint from which it had 
been seen when asked to do so. Brandimonte, Schooler, and Gabbino (1997) also have shown 
that the detrimental effects of object naming in longer-term visual remembering can be 
reversed by providing colour as a visual cue to facilitate access to the original visual 
representation. And in an earlier study of verbal overshadowing, Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (1990) demonstrated that requiring participants to make their face recognition 
judgements quickly removed the verbal overshadowing effect, confirming that the original 
visual representation of the face had not been eradicated when participants provided a verbal 
Object Naming              
 
15
description of the face. Finally, Schacter and colleagues (e.g., Cooper & Schacter, 1992; 
Schacter & Cooper, 1993; Schacter, Cooper & Delaney, 1990) and Burgund and Marsolek 
(2000) have confirmed that viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-independent visual 
representations can co-exist in memory, and that particular task conditions can determine 
which type of representation impacts on performance (e.g., whether the test stimulus is 
presented directly to the left or right cerebral hemisphere).   
 Although the focus has been on viewpoint in the present study, the conceptual 
framework being proposed implies that other visual features will correlate with object 
naming and longer-term remembering. It is predicted that whenever conditions are such as to 
encourage the drawer to rely on an image-like representation, their drawings will be more 
likely to reflect object shape with metric accuracy, and to reproduce the object’s material 
properties (e.g., surface texture and colour). Conversely, these features will be less apparent 
when conditions are such as to encourage the drawer to rely on a GSD. Further work is 
required to assess these predictions, and to see if these other features of drawings will co-
occur with viewpoint-dependence.  
 When a person names a familiar object with its category label, they are required to 
categorise the object visually, and in many situations this in turn will require them to derive a 
structural description. But why should hearing someone else name a novel object with a 
novel count noun induce a person to visually categorise the object? That it should do so is 
often assumed in discussions of language acquisition. According to Waxman (1999), for 
example, object naming by someone else (typically by an adult, who also gestures towards 
the object) is perceived by young children to be an act of object categorisation, encouraging 
the children themselves to categorise the object. In this way, children learn to associate a 
visual representation of the object’s category with a verbal representation of the name 
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provided by the adult, which typically is the name of the object’s category. The claim being 
made here is that these processes, which are so important in early language development, 
remain influential in later life. Thus, just like young children, adults who hear an 
experimenter name a novel object with a novel count noun also perceive the experimenter to 
be categorising the object and also, therefore, are induced to derive a visual category 
representation for the object. On this account, verbal recoding has a significant impact on 
visual information processing, including visual remembering, even when it is someone else 
who is heard to do the verbal recoding.  
 Verbal overshadowing. Much of the work on verbal overshadowing has focused on 
using faces as stimuli, has required participants to provide verbal descriptions of the faces, 
and has then examined the impact of this on explicit, forced-choice visual recognition 
memory for the faces. Of course, providing a verbal description of an item is not the same as 
naming it, and faces are a distinct class of stimuli with distinct systems of visual 
categorisation. Despite these differences, however, it is worth reflecting on some implications 
of the conceptual framework presented here for studies of verbal overshadowing. 
 The first point to make is that because distinct forms of visual processing support the 
derivation of distinct types of representation, the present conceptualisation allows either the 
type of encoding, or the type of representation, to be emphasised in accounts of verbal 
overshadowing. That is, explanations of overshadowing based on representational 
competition (e.g., Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) are not incompatible with 
explanations based on the transfer of inappropriate processing (e.g., Schooler, 2002). 
 A second point to make relates to the fact that early accounts of verbal overshadowing 
emphasise the contrast between verbal and visual representations of the same item, and how 
the relative utility of these forms of representation varies according to context. Accordingly, 
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these accounts require that the foils for the recognition test are selected carefully, so that it is 
clear if, and to what extent, recognition can be supported by verbal representations. If it 
cannot, because the target and foils share similar verbal descriptions, then any verbal 
overshadowing that occurs will have to be explained without reference to the 
availability/accessibility of verbal representations. The present conceptualisation indicates 
that it is also important to know the extent to which visual recognition can be supported by 
visual category representations, and again the nature of the foils is critically important. To 
give one example, if all the foils were to share the same basic geon structural description as 
the target, then visual category representations would be precluded from supporting visual 
recognition memory, which instead would have to rely exclusively on visual representations 
that are capable of discriminating among examplars from the same visual category (i.e., rely 
on visual images).   
 Studies of the impact of verbal recoding on visual image manipulation were designed 
to preclude verbal representations from mediating performance, so that interest could be 
focussed on alternative forms of visual representation and their differential association with 
object naming and memory delay (see, for example, Hitch et al., 1995, & Walker et al., 
1997). But is performance in the current object drawing task supported exclusively by visual 
memory representations, or can verbal representations make a contribution? In principle, 
verbal representations have the potential to support object drawing. However, it is important 
to note that the novel count noun assigned to the object participants in the present study had 
to draw carried no information about the nature of the object, and so could not contribute 
directly to drawing.  
 A final point to make is that unconstrained verbal descriptions can include the names 
of different types of visual category to which an item belongs, although they need not. 
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Indeed, in some studies of verbal overshadowing, participants have been instructed to include 
category labels in their descriptions (e.g., personality type, occupational category, age group, 
gender, weight category, and hair colour). However, control over the inclusion of category 
labels is not normally exercised, nor are the foils for the recognition test selected with the 
potential utility of category representations in mind. Uncertainty often remains, therefore, 
regarding the involvement of category representations in supporting visual recognition 
memory. From a purely procedural point of view, therefore, the present conceptual 
framework, and the success of the present study, indicates that there might be considerable 
merit in providing participants with a verbal description, rather than asking them to generate 
their own. The fact that the description is provided by someone else might not be critical, 
allowing control to be exercised over the nature of the verbal description that might lead to 
verbal overshadowing.  
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1  As a referee has correctly pointed out, a GSD could have an associative link to a 
representation of the typical colour for a category of object, and evidence from 
neuropsychology indicates this to be the case. However, notwithstanding the presence of such 
links, structural descriptions and colour will still be separately represented, allowing stored 
information about structure to be accessed selectively, without information about colour 
being accessed at the same time. Our argument is that the same selectivity is not an option 
when images are accessed, because images do not represent structure and colour separately, 
but rather in an integrated manner. In addition, of course, many object categories, especially 
artefacts, do not have a typical colour, so their GSDs will not be linked to representations of 
colour. 
2  A count noun is a noun for a single entity, including objects (lamp) and mental entities 
(image), that can be counted. Hence, count nouns appear with indefinite articles in phrases 
refering to a single instance of a type of entity (a lamp), and in phrases refering to multiple 
instances of a type of entity (six lamps, many images). 
3  With regard to why, when an orientation has to be specified for a category of object, 
certain orientations become preferred, we presume there are many contributing factors. 
Frequency of exposure to particular orientations would be the most obvious, though this 
cannot apply here. The ease with which the constituent geons can be discriminated from a 
particular orientation is claimed to be another factor. In addition, as a referee pointed out, the 
stability of an object in a particular orientation is likely to be another factor, in part because 
an unstable orientation is an unlikely orientation from which to encounter the same type of 
object in the future. Having said this, however, we might note the overwhelming tendency for 
people to draw bicycles in an unstable orientation (i.e., upright, and with no apparent support 
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being depicted). The functional significance of certain orientations also is likely to be very 
important. Thus, drinking mugs can only serve their usual function from a limited range of 
orientations, and they normally do this best when their handles are pointing to the viewer’s 
right (so that a right-handed person can grasp the mug easily). We intend to run a study in 
which we explain an intended function for our novel object. In one condition, this function 
will require the object to be oriented with the attached part pointing down (e.g., so that 
indentations can be made in pastry). We then expect this orientation to become the preferred 
one, and the one towards which drawers will shift when object naming is combined with 
longer-term remembering. 
4  A good illustration that object drawing can reveal the varying contributions of different 
types of visual representation according to memory delay is provided by a Bozeat et al. 
(2003). They presented geometric designs and pictures of familiar objects to patients with 
semantic dementia. They asked the patients either to copy the pictures, or to draw them some 
time after they had been removed from view. With regard to the pictures of familiar objects, 
the patients produced good copies, but their drawings after a delay were much less good. In 
addition, the quality of an individual patient’s delayed drawings was correlated with the 
severity of their dementia, and with the quality of the drawings they produced of the same 
objects in response to being given their names. There was no unusual deterioration with delay 
in their drawings of the geometric designs. The point to note in the context of the present 
study is that whereas immediate object drawing was uninfluenced by category representations 
in long-term memory, and hence by the dementia, delayed object drawing was. 
5  It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explore either the nature of the processes 
required to derive each type of visual representation, or the interdependencies between them. 
Though they are likely to share very early visual encoding pathways, it is not clear at what 
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point they dissociate. It is also unclear if the processes dissociate to operate in parallel of each 
other, as illustrated in Figure 3, or if the processes responsible for deriving a viewpoint-
independent structural description follow in sequence those responsible for deriving the 








Figure 1. The sequence of visual events in each memory condition. 
Figure 2. The  number of participants depicting the novel object from the restricted 
viewpoint from which it had been seen, or from some other viewpoint, as a function of 
whether or not the object was named with a novel count noun at encoding, and according 
to whether it was drawn from immediate memory (IMM), short-term memory (STM), or 
longer-term memory (LTM). 
Figure 3. The conceptual framework developed to accommodate the results of the present 
study and related findings. The information provided by the two types of visual 
representation is depicted as converging on common production mechanisms. This is 
intended to reflect the fact that a single drawing need not be based exclusively on one 
type of representation, but can be based on a mix of representations, including viewpoint-
specific object representations and category representations (for evidence, see Walker et 
al., 2006).  
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